在美國經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家西奧多·舒爾茨提出的人力資本理論的視域下，員工系公司重要的人力資本；而現(xiàn)代公司治理體系強(qiáng)調(diào)所有權(quán)和經(jīng)營權(quán)分離，股東傾向于只投入成本而不參與經(jīng)營，人力資本的使用往往會受到一定程度的制約。因此股權(quán)激勵應(yīng)運而生，其將公司員工納入剩余收益的分配中，使得員工的報酬收入與公司業(yè)績掛鉤，讓員工在實現(xiàn)個人利益大化的同時為公司創(chuàng)造更大的價值。在股權(quán)激勵的場景下設(shè)計股權(quán)架構(gòu)，當(dāng)然應(yīng)追求激勵效果、充分發(fā)揮其吸引、保留人才的作用，但更應(yīng)強(qiáng)調(diào)的是對激勵對象的管控，使其不至于本末倒置、影響實控人對公司的控制。筆者推薦實控人設(shè)立有限合伙企業(yè)間接持股，而非選擇讓員工直接持股。

In the perspective of the human capital theory proposed by American economist Theodore Schultz, employees are important human capital for companies; The modern corporate governance system emphasizes the separation of ownership and management rights, and shareholders tend to only invest costs without participating in operations. The use of human capital is often constrained to a certain extent. Therefore, equity incentives have emerged, which include company employees in the distribution of surplus income, linking their compensation income to company performance, allowing employees to create greater value for the company while maximizing their personal interests. In the context of equity incentives, designing an equity structure should certainly pursue incentive effects and fully leverage its role in attracting and retaining talent. However, it is even more important to emphasize the control of incentive targets, so as not to reverse priorities and affect the actual controller's control over the company. The author recommends that the actual controller establish a limited partnership enterprise to indirectly hold shares, rather than allowing employees to directly hold shares.

首先，有限合伙型持股平臺有效避免了股東人數(shù)的限制。根據(jù)《公司法》第42條以及第92條的規(guī)定，有限責(zé)任公司股東人數(shù)上限為50人，股份有限公司為200人。對于激勵對象較多的企業(yè)而言，如果任由全部激勵對象都采取直接持股，人數(shù)容易突破《公司法》規(guī)定的限制。這種情況下，公司可以考慮設(shè)置多個有限合伙企業(yè)予以規(guī)避，只需保證每個合伙企業(yè)人數(shù)低于法定的50人即可。

Firstly, limited partnership shareholding platforms effectively avoid restrictions on the number of shareholders. According to Article 42 and Article 92 of the Company Law, the maximum number of shareholders for a limited liability company is 50, and for a joint-stock limited company it is 200. For enterprises with a large number of incentive targets, if all incentive targets are allowed to directly hold shares, the number of people may easily exceed the restrictions stipulated in the Company Law. In this case, the company can consider setting up multiple limited partnerships to avoid it, as long as the number of people in each partnership is less than the legal limit of 50.

其次，有限合伙型持股平臺可以保證實控人的控制權(quán)。在員工直接持股的模式下，存在無法形成有效的公司股東會決議的隱患，實控人不能保證激勵對象始終能保持對審議事項的贊成態(tài)度，如重大事項上實控人所持表決權(quán)不能形成2/3以上的絕對控制，決議的命運即掌握在激勵對象這些關(guān)鍵少數(shù)手中。而在有限合伙型的持股平臺，由激勵對象擔(dān)任有限合伙人（LP），實控人擔(dān)任普通合伙人（GP），從而使激勵對象只能通過持股平臺間接收獲公司股息、分紅等，而實控人作為GP可以執(zhí)行合伙事務(wù)，有效地掌握了對于持股平臺所持公司股權(quán)的表決權(quán)，保證了控制權(quán)的穩(wěn)定性。此外，如涉及公司的股權(quán)變更、增資，實務(wù)中工商部門一般都需要全體股東簽字方能完成變更手續(xù)。假設(shè)任意一位激勵對象拒絕配合簽字，公司都將面臨無法變更的僵局。再者，如實控人與激勵對象之間發(fā)生矛盾，不排除激勵對象可能會提起股東訴訟，從而影響到公司的正常運營，嚴(yán)重者甚至?xí)霈F(xiàn)公司僵局。而有限合伙企業(yè)則杜絕了前述情形出現(xiàn)的可能，其起到了很好的糾紛阻隔作用，讓股東們的糾紛都在持股平臺內(nèi)解決，不至于殃及公司。

Secondly, a limited partnership shareholding platform can ensure the control rights of the actual controller. In the mode of direct employee shareholding, there is a hidden danger that effective resolutions of the company's shareholders' meeting cannot be formed. The actual controller cannot guarantee that the incentive objects can always maintain a favorable attitude towards the deliberation matters. For example, on major issues, the actual controller's voting rights cannot form an absolute control of more than 2/3, and the fate of the resolution is in the hands of the key few of the incentive objects. In a limited partnership type shareholding platform, the incentive object serves as the limited partner (LP), and the actual controller serves as the general partner (GP), so that the incentive object can only indirectly receive company dividends, bonuses, etc. through the shareholding platform. The actual controller, as the GP, can execute partnership affairs and effectively control the voting rights of the company's equity held by the shareholding platform, ensuring the stability of control rights. In addition, if it involves changes in the company's equity or capital increase, in practice, the industrial and commercial department generally requires the signatures of all shareholders to complete the change procedures. If any incentive recipient refuses to cooperate and sign, the company will face an unchangeable deadlock. Furthermore, if there is a conflict between the actual controller and the incentive object, it cannot be ruled out that the incentive object may file a shareholder lawsuit, which may affect the normal operation of the company, and in severe cases, even lead to a company deadlock. And limited partnership enterprises eliminate the possibility of the aforementioned situation, playing a good role in preventing disputes, allowing shareholders' disputes to be resolved within the shareholding platform, without affecting the company.

當(dāng)然，單從稅負(fù)角度來看，有限合伙型持股平臺并非優(yōu)解。在公司分紅的場景下，如系自然人直接持股，員工個人應(yīng)根據(jù)《個人所得稅法》的規(guī)定，按照股息、紅利所得繳納20%的所得稅。公司上市后，自然人可享受相應(yīng)的稅收優(yōu)惠。根據(jù)《財政部、國家稅務(wù)總局、證監(jiān)會關(guān)于實施上市公司股息紅利差別化個人所得稅政策有關(guān)問題的通知》、《關(guān)于上市公司股息紅利差別化個人所得稅政策有關(guān)問題的通知》的規(guī)定，對個人持有的上市公司限售股，限售期內(nèi)的應(yīng)納稅所得額減按50%計算；解禁后如持股期限超過1年的，可暫免征收個人所得稅。而在有限合伙的持股模式下，根據(jù)《國家稅務(wù)總局關(guān)于<關(guān)于個人獨資企業(yè)和合伙企業(yè)投資者征收個人所得稅的規(guī)定>執(zhí)行口徑的通知》，不論公司是否上市，激勵對象都應(yīng)就其取得的股息、紅利適用20%的稅率繳納個人所得稅。從長遠(yuǎn)來看，有限合伙型持股平臺在稅負(fù)成本上要高于直接持股。但正如上文所述，股權(quán)激勵的主要矛盾應(yīng)該是維護(hù)控制權(quán)、管控激勵對象，因此稅負(fù)成本作為次要矛盾應(yīng)適當(dāng)讓位。

Of course, from the perspective of tax burden alone, limited partnership shareholding platforms are not an optimal solution. In the scenario of company dividends, if natural persons directly hold shares, employees should pay 20% income tax on dividends and bonus income in accordance with the provisions of the Personal Income Tax Law. After the company goes public, natural persons can enjoy corresponding tax benefits. According to the "Notice of the Ministry of Finance, the State Administration of Taxation, and the China Securities Regulatory Commission on Relevant Issues Concerning the Implementation of Differentiated Personal Income Tax Policies for Dividends and Bonuses of Listed Companies" and the "Notice on Relevant Issues Concerning Differentiated Personal Income Tax Policies for Dividends and Bonuses of Listed Companies", for restricted shares held by individuals in listed companies, the taxable income during the restricted period shall be reduced by 50%; If the shareholding period exceeds one year after lifting the ban, personal income tax can be temporarily exempted. In the limited partnership shareholding model, according to the Notice of the State Administration of Taxation on the Implementation Criteria of the Regulations on the Collection of Personal Income Tax for Investors of Sole Proprietorship Enterprises and Partnership Enterprises, regardless of whether the company is listed or not, incentive recipients should pay personal income tax at a rate of 20% on the dividends and bonuses they receive. In the long run, limited partnership shareholding platforms have higher tax costs than direct shareholding. But as mentioned earlier, the main contradiction of equity incentives should be to maintain control and manage the incentive objects, so the cost of tax burden should be appropriately given way as a secondary contradiction.

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