股權(quán)設(shè)計(jì)與激勵(lì)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，主要來(lái)源于以下因素，下面山東股權(quán)激勵(lì)公司為你講解。

The risk of equity design and incentive mainly comes from the following factors, which are explained by Shandong Equity Incentive Company.

高管因素

Executive factors

在企業(yè)的股權(quán)設(shè)計(jì)與激勵(lì)過(guò)程中，高管的持股數(shù)量與時(shí)間總是有限的。而他們更關(guān)心的是其股票價(jià)值，而非公司長(zhǎng)期價(jià)值。再加上股權(quán)價(jià)值的變動(dòng)又不僅僅取決于高管本人努力，還會(huì)受到企業(yè)內(nèi)外、行業(yè)背景和市場(chǎng)大環(huán)境等因素的影響。這些都會(huì)制約股權(quán)設(shè)計(jì)和激勵(lì)的效果，甚至產(chǎn)生事與愿違的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。

In the process of equity design and incentive, the number and time of senior executives' shareholding are always limited. They are more concerned about the value of their shares than the long-term value of the company. In addition, the change of equity value is not only determined by the efforts of executives, but also affected by factors such as internal and external enterprises, industry background and market environment. All of these will restrict the effect of equity design and incentive, and even cause unexpected risks.

激勵(lì)方案問(wèn)題

Incentive scheme issues

激勵(lì)方案如果有其缺陷，或者沒(méi)有完全被按照規(guī)定程序制定，就會(huì)帶來(lái)較大風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。例如，激勵(lì)方案的制定者如果真是被激勵(lì)者范圍內(nèi)的員工，整個(gè)股權(quán)設(shè)計(jì)和激勵(lì)方案的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)都會(huì)大為增加，股權(quán)設(shè)計(jì)與激勵(lì)可能會(huì)被操控，變成個(gè)人或小集體牟私利的工具。

If the incentive plan has its defects or is not fully formulated according to the prescribed procedures, it will bring greater risks. For example, if the maker of the incentive plan is really an employee within the scope of the incentive, the risk of the entire equity design and incentive plan will be greatly increased, and the equity design and incentive may be manipulated and become a tool for individuals or small groups to make private profits.

執(zhí)行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。

Execution risk.

無(wú)論方案多么的好，在執(zhí)行過(guò)程中，依然會(huì)由于內(nèi)部原因、外部環(huán)境或其他控制因素的影響，導(dǎo)致執(zhí)行結(jié)果偏離公司的長(zhǎng)期目標(biāo)。

No matter how good the plan is, the implementation results will still deviate from the company's long-term objectives due to internal reasons, external environment or other control factors.

財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。

Financial indicator risk.

如果財(cái)務(wù)制度沒(méi)有完全真實(shí)體現(xiàn)出激勵(lì)對(duì)象的業(yè)績(jī)，或者存在不合理的會(huì)計(jì)政策，甚至有高管進(jìn)行人為干預(yù),那么都會(huì)導(dǎo)致產(chǎn)生財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)不真實(shí)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。這樣，以財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)為基礎(chǔ)的激勵(lì)方案就會(huì)存在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。

If the financial system does not fully and truly reflect the performance of the incentive object, or there are unreasonable accounting policies, or even senior executives intervene, it will lead to the risk of financial indicators being untrue. In this way, the incentive scheme based on financial indicators will have risks.

法律制度

legal system

如果法律制度或者監(jiān)管政策的變動(dòng)超出了公司的控制范圍，影響到激勵(lì)方案的實(shí)施，也同樣會(huì)帶來(lái)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。

If the change of the legal system or regulatory policy is beyond the control of the company and affects the implementation of the incentive plan, it will also bring risks.

要求對(duì)整個(gè)公司業(yè)績(jī)有客觀的評(píng)價(jià)。由于國(guó)內(nèi)資本市場(chǎng)目前還不成然，公司價(jià)值往無(wú)法通過(guò)股價(jià)來(lái)進(jìn)行確定，反而由市場(chǎng)積租來(lái)驚期，甚至被現(xiàn)出青離趨勢(shì)。因此，在股權(quán)設(shè)計(jì)和微閱過(guò)程中，微時(shí)對(duì)象很可能承擔(dān)潛在的市場(chǎng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。更多相關(guān)股權(quán)的內(nèi)容就來(lái)我們網(wǎng)站http://zhenzhush.com/咨詢！

An objective evaluation of the performance of the whole company is required. Because the domestic capital market is not yet in place, the value of the company can not be determined by the share price. Instead, it is surprised by the rent accumulation in the market, and even shows the trend of leaving. Therefore, in the process of equity design and micro-review, micro-time objects are likely to bear potential market risks. More equity related content can be found on our website http://zhenzhush.com/ consulting service