風(fēng)險(xiǎn)一：激勵(lì)對(duì)象的道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)
Risk 1: Moral hazard of incentive targets
股權(quán)激勵(lì)的初衷是解決企業(yè)所有者與管理者之間的利益平衡問題。管理者為公司披肝瀝膽，厥功甚偉，理應(yīng)獲得對(duì)應(yīng)的獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)。當(dāng)管理者獲得股權(quán)后，也成了企業(yè)所有者的一員，跟公司的長遠(yuǎn)利益更加一致，更加關(guān)心公司的未來前途。
The original intention of equity incentives is to solve the problem of balancing the interests of enterprise owners and managers. Managers have made great contributions to the company and deserve corresponding rewards. When managers acquire equity, they become part of the owner of the enterprise, more aligned with the long-term interests of the company, and more concerned about the future prospects of the company.
要實(shí)現(xiàn)這個(gè)目標(biāo)的前提是，激勵(lì)對(duì)象擁有較高的道德水平。通常而言，管理層既是股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的執(zhí)行者，也是受益者。假如沒有權(quán)責(zé)明確的規(guī)章制度約束，激勵(lì)對(duì)象有可能為了一己私利而擅自從事高風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資活動(dòng)，甚至操控財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)和股價(jià)。
The prerequisite for achieving this goal is that the target audience has a high moral level. Generally speaking, management is both the executor and beneficiary of equity incentive plans. If there are no clear rules and regulations on rights and responsibilities, incentive targets may engage in high-risk investment activities for personal gain, and even manipulate financial indicators and stock prices.
為此，公司在制定股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃時(shí)應(yīng)該引入獨(dú)立董事，董事會(huì)下設(shè)的股權(quán)激勵(lì)專門委員會(huì)要加強(qiáng)對(duì)股權(quán)激勵(lì)的監(jiān)管。
Therefore, when formulating equity incentive plans, companies should introduce independent directors, and the equity incentive committee under the board of directors should strengthen the supervision of equity incentives.
風(fēng)險(xiǎn)二：激勵(lì)對(duì)象坐吃山空
Risk 2: The incentive target is sitting on the sidelines
部分創(chuàng)業(yè)公司本想為老員工提供更好的保障，讓他們對(duì)公司更加忠誠，但在施行豐厚的股權(quán)激勵(lì)時(shí)沒有建立配套的約束機(jī)制。于是，一些激勵(lì)對(duì)象安于現(xiàn)狀，只是坐享分紅，而不再積極進(jìn)取。如此一來，股權(quán)激勵(lì)從激勵(lì)手段淪為“懶人”的保護(hù)傘，完全違背了公司的初衷。隨著“懶人”的增加，公司上下都會(huì)變得毫無干勁，從而導(dǎo)致業(yè)績滑坡。
Some startup companies originally intended to provide better protection for their old employees and make them more loyal to the company, but did not establish a supporting constraint mechanism when implementing generous equity incentives. So, some incentive targets are content with the status quo, just sitting on the dividends, and no longer actively striving. In this way, equity incentives have become a protective umbrella for "lazy people" from incentive methods, completely violating the company's original intention. With the increase of "lazy people", the entire company will become unresponsive, leading to a decline in performance.
風(fēng)險(xiǎn)三：淪為套現(xiàn)工具
Risk Three: Becoming a Cash Out Tool
股權(quán)激勵(lì)的效果受到行權(quán)條件的直接影響。如果行權(quán)條件要求過高，激勵(lì)對(duì)象費(fèi)了九牛二虎之力才勉強(qiáng)達(dá)到，就不會(huì)產(chǎn)生太好的激勵(lì)效果。與之相反的錯(cuò)誤是行權(quán)條件要求過低，讓激勵(lì)對(duì)象不費(fèi)吹灰之力就能輕松獲得股權(quán)。他們的注意力將從努力工作轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)榕μ赚F(xiàn)，只想著增加個(gè)人收益，損害公司和其他股東的利益。
The effectiveness of equity incentives is directly influenced by the exercise conditions. If the requirements for exercise of rights are too high, and the incentive object has had a lot of effort to barely achieve it, it will not have a very good incentive effect. The opposite mistake is that the exercise conditions are too low, allowing incentive recipients to easily obtain equity without any effort. Their attention will shift from working hard to working hard to cashing out, with a focus on increasing personal income and harming the interests of the company and other shareholders.
風(fēng)險(xiǎn)四：增加財(cái)務(wù)成本
Risk 4: Increasing financial costs
實(shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃時(shí)必須充分考慮公司當(dāng)前的資金狀況。假如短期內(nèi)的激勵(lì)幅度太大，公司的資金周轉(zhuǎn)就會(huì)變得緊張，財(cái)務(wù)收益減少，甚至因業(yè)績下滑而虧損。這對(duì)急需融資的企業(yè)來說是很不利的。為此，我們?cè)谥贫ü蓹?quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃的時(shí)候，要仔細(xì)考慮激勵(lì)成本對(duì)公司利潤的影響，減少不必要的財(cái)務(wù)成本。
When implementing equity incentive plans, it is necessary to fully consider the current financial situation of the company. If the short-term incentive is too large, the company's capital turnover will become tight, financial returns will decrease, and even suffer losses due to performance decline. This is very unfavorable for enterprises that urgently need financing. Therefore, when formulating equity incentive plans, we should carefully consider the impact of incentive costs on the company's profits and reduce unnecessary financial costs.
風(fēng)險(xiǎn)五：影響上市和融資成功率
Risk 5: Impact on the success rate of listing and financing
對(duì)于正在準(zhǔn)備上市的公司而言，股權(quán)變更往往會(huì)被特別關(guān)注。因?yàn)橛行┕炯俳韫蓹?quán)激勵(lì)的名義在暗地里進(jìn)行利益輸送。還有的公司選擇的激勵(lì)對(duì)象經(jīng)不起審計(jì)，不符合公司的利益。
For companies preparing to go public, equity changes often receive special attention. Because some companies use the name of equity incentives to secretly transmit profits. Some companies choose incentive targets that cannot withstand auditing and are not in line with the company's interests.
這些情況都會(huì)影響公司上市的成功率和融資成功率。所以，我們?cè)谥贫ê蛯?shí)施股權(quán)激勵(lì)計(jì)劃時(shí)，必須聘請(qǐng)的法律顧問把關(guān)，確保每個(gè)股權(quán)激勵(lì)相關(guān)文件合理合法，避免一切不規(guī)范的做法。這樣才能確保公司上市成功，融資順利，健康發(fā)展。
These situations will all affect the success rate of a company's listing and financing success rate. Therefore, when formulating and implementing equity incentive plans, we must hire professional legal advisors to ensure that each equity incentive related document is reasonable and legal, and avoid all non-standard practices. Only in this way can we ensure the success of the company's listing, smooth financing, and healthy development.
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