在股權(quán)激勵(lì)中，引入股票期權(quán)，通過將公司經(jīng)營(yíng)管理者的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)收入轉(zhuǎn)化為股票，從而將個(gè)人利益與公司長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)利益緊緊地聯(lián)系在一起，大限度地激勵(lì)核心人員才能的發(fā)揮。同時(shí)，設(shè)立相應(yīng)的股權(quán)約束機(jī)制，實(shí)現(xiàn)個(gè)人必須隨時(shí)為自己的行為負(fù)責(zé)，從而促進(jìn)核心人員正當(dāng)?shù)拈L(zhǎng)期行為，實(shí)現(xiàn)現(xiàn)代資本持續(xù)高質(zhì)量增值。
In the equity incentive, the introduction of stock options, by converting the risk income of the company's managers into stocks, closely links the personal interests with the company's long-term interests, and greatly stimulates the talents of the core personnel. At the same time, set up corresponding equity restraint mechanism to realize that individuals must be responsible for their own behavior at any time, so as to promote the legitimate long-term behavior of core personnel and realize the continuous high-quality appreciation of modern capital.
This paper will analyze and explain the other two types of equity restraint systems, namely, the equity locking system and the non-compete system, in order to realize the panoramic display of the equity restraint mechanism. Jinan Equity Structure Design Company will analyze for you:
【股權(quán)鎖定制度】
[Equity locking system]
這種制度原本是指公司在一定期限內(nèi)，未經(jīng)投資人書面同意，創(chuàng)業(yè)者不得向任何人轉(zhuǎn)讓其以人力資本出資獲得的公司股權(quán)。在公司未成熟階段，創(chuàng)業(yè)者的股權(quán)是被自然鎖定的，而這一制度是在股權(quán)成熟基礎(chǔ)上，進(jìn)一步要求創(chuàng)業(yè)者的股權(quán)在成熟后的一定期限內(nèi)不得轉(zhuǎn)讓。
This system originally meant that within a certain period of time, without the written consent of the investors, the entrepreneurs should not transfer the company's equity acquired by human capital contributions to anyone. In the immature stage of the company, the equity of entrepreneurs is naturally locked, and this system is based on the maturity of equity, and further requires that the equity of entrepreneurs cannot be transferred within a certain period after maturity.
相應(yīng)地，為了加強(qiáng)對(duì)人力資本出資形成的股權(quán)的約束，也可以在創(chuàng)始人與合作伙伴及其他類型的持有人之間制定股權(quán)鎖定制度。具體的鎖定條件設(shè)置可以依據(jù)公司實(shí)際情況自主約定，比如在股權(quán)成熟之日起滿一定期限之前、公司第n輪融資前、公司估值達(dá)到X萬元之前、公司IPO之前等，不得進(jìn)行股權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)讓或部分股權(quán)不得進(jìn)行轉(zhuǎn)讓。
Accordingly, in order to strengthen the restriction on the equity formed by human capital contribution, the equity lock-in system can also be established between the founder, partners and other types of holders. The specific lock-in conditions can be set independently according to the actual situation of the company. For example, no equity transfer or partial equity transfer is allowed before the expiration of a certain period from the date of equity maturity, before the company's nth round of financing, before the company's valuation reaches X million yuan, and before the company's IPO.
鎖定制度的原理是：基于人力資本形成的股權(quán)，因沒有物力資本投入，在溢價(jià)融資成功時(shí)，會(huì)使這些股權(quán)價(jià)值大幅度上升，若允許隨時(shí)轉(zhuǎn)讓套現(xiàn)，一方面會(huì)引發(fā)投機(jī)情緒和道德風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，不利于創(chuàng)業(yè)公司的穩(wěn)定，另一方面對(duì)投資人也不公平，因?yàn)樗麄兺际歉咭鐑r(jià)進(jìn)入的，接受溢價(jià)的前提中已經(jīng)包含了對(duì)人力資本的認(rèn)可以及對(duì)目標(biāo)公司未來發(fā)展的預(yù)期。
The principle of the lock-in system is that the equity formed based on human capital, because there is no material capital input, will greatly increase the value of these equity when the premium financing is successful. If the transfer of cash at any time is allowed, on the one hand, it will cause speculation and moral hazard, which is not conducive to the stability of the start-up company, on the other hand, it is also unfair to investors, because they often enter at a high premium, The premise of accepting the premium has included the recognition of human capital and the expectation of the target company's future development.
【競(jìng)業(yè)禁止制度】
[Non competition system]
這里所講的“競(jìng)業(yè)禁止”與《勞動(dòng)合同法》中所稱的“競(jìng)業(yè)限制”是不同的概念。此處的“競(jìng)業(yè)禁止”是基于股權(quán)關(guān)系產(chǎn)生的，且不向承擔(dān)此義務(wù)的股東支付經(jīng)濟(jì)補(bǔ)償；而“競(jìng)業(yè)限制”是基于勞動(dòng)關(guān)系產(chǎn)生的，且要向承擔(dān)此業(yè)務(wù)的勞動(dòng)者支付經(jīng)濟(jì)補(bǔ)償。
The "prohibition of competition" mentioned here is different from the "restriction of competition" in the Labor Contract Law. The "prohibition of business strife" here is based on the equity relationship and does not pay economic compensation to the shareholders who undertake this obligation; The "competition restriction" is based on labor relations, and economic compensation should be paid to the workers who undertake this business.
為了保護(hù)公司的人力資本價(jià)值，可以要求創(chuàng)業(yè)股東及其合作伙伴在公司任職及離開后的一段時(shí)間內(nèi)，不能到與公司有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)關(guān)系的其他用人單位任職，或者參與和公司有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)關(guān)系的公司。這種約定的背后原理是：股東持有股權(quán)的條件是以人力資本作為出資，這些人的人力資本已經(jīng)隨著出資動(dòng)作的完成，而成為公司財(cái)產(chǎn)的一部分，如果允許股東繼續(xù)向其他公司出資，不僅對(duì)其他股東、投資人不公平的，而且也會(huì)損害創(chuàng)業(yè)公司的利益。
In order to protect the value of the company's human capital, the entrepreneurial shareholders and their partners can be required not to work in other employers that compete with the company, or participate in companies that compete with the company for a period of time after taking office and leaving the company. The underlying principle of this agreement is that the condition for shareholders to hold equity is to use human capital as capital contribution. These people's human capital has become part of the company's property with the completion of the capital contribution. If shareholders are allowed to continue to contribute to other companies, it will not only be unfair to other shareholders and investors, but also damage the interests of the startup company.
基于市場(chǎng)經(jīng)濟(jì)的不斷運(yùn)行發(fā)展，公司管理者應(yīng)當(dāng)科學(xué)處理股權(quán)激勵(lì)與股權(quán)約束機(jī)制的關(guān)系，實(shí)現(xiàn)激勵(lì)機(jī)制與約束機(jī)制平衡發(fā)展，促進(jìn)公司的良性運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)。
Based on the continuous operation and development of market economy, company managers should scientifically deal with the relationship between equity incentive and equity constraint mechanism, realize the balanced development of incentive mechanism and constraint mechanism, and promote the benign operation of the company.
要形成科學(xué)的法人治理結(jié)構(gòu)，并明確規(guī)定股東、董事會(huì)、監(jiān)事會(huì)和總經(jīng)理之間的權(quán)利、責(zé)任和利益，進(jìn)一步落實(shí)監(jiān)事管理制度，形成相互制衡的關(guān)系，這種相互制衡關(guān)系本質(zhì)上就是一種約束機(jī)制，監(jiān)事會(huì)受股東大會(huì)的委托負(fù)責(zé)監(jiān)督董事會(huì)和總經(jīng)理的活動(dòng)，并接受股東大會(huì)的監(jiān)督。
We should form a scientific corporate governance structure, clearly define the rights, responsibilities and interests of shareholders, the board of directors, the board of supervisors and the general manager, further implement the supervisory management system, and form a relationship of checks and balances. This relationship of checks and balances is essentially a binding mechanism. The board of supervisors is entrusted by the shareholders' meeting to supervise the activities of the board of directors and the general manager, and accept the supervision of the shareholders' meeting.
我國(guó)《公司法》規(guī)定，監(jiān)事會(huì)有行使檢查公司財(cái)務(wù)，對(duì)董事會(huì)、經(jīng)理執(zhí)行職務(wù)違反法律、法規(guī)或者公司章程的行為進(jìn)行監(jiān)督，當(dāng)董事和經(jīng)理的行為損害公司利益時(shí)進(jìn)行糾正、提議召開股東會(huì)等權(quán)力。公司的外部約束指來自各方面的市場(chǎng)約束。
According to the Company Law of China, the Board of Supervisors has the power to inspect the company's financial affairs, supervise the acts of the Board of Directors and the Manager in violation of laws, regulations or the Articles of Association when performing their duties, correct the acts of the Directors and the Manager when they damage the company's interests, and propose to convene a shareholders' meeting. External constraints of the company refer to market constraints from all aspects.
發(fā)達(dá)的、充分競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的經(jīng)營(yíng)管理者市場(chǎng)可以為公司提供較大的選擇空間，對(duì)在位經(jīng)營(yíng)管理者形成優(yōu)勝劣汰的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)壓力。特別是在建立現(xiàn)代公司制度的過程中，由于中大型公司內(nèi)部的多重復(fù)雜關(guān)系，在可能導(dǎo)致內(nèi)部治理結(jié)構(gòu)不規(guī)范的條件下，應(yīng)特別注重發(fā)揮競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)公司經(jīng)營(yíng)管理者的約束作用。更多相關(guān)股權(quán)的問題就來我們網(wǎng)站
http://zhenzhush.com咨詢吧！
A developed and fully competitive market for managers can provide companies with greater choice space and create competitive pressure on incumbent managers to survive the fittest. Especially in the process of establishing a modern corporate system, due to the multiple and complex relationships within large and medium-sized companies, under the condition that the internal governance structure may not be standardized, special attention should be paid to the restriction of competition on the company's managers. For more equity related questions, please visit our website http://zhenzhush.com Ask!
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